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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, a public entity, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an individual 
d/b/a the Pawn Shop, a Utah 
corporation; and TERRY PANTELAKIS, 
an individual d/b/a Jewelers & 
Loans, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
and 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS, et al•, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, a public entity, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT D. 
BARROWS, JR.; BEATRICE IRENE 
BARROWS; ELLEN K. DASKALAS, an 
individual, d/b/a The Pawn Shop, 
THE PAWN SHOP, a Utah Corporation; 
JAMES ANDERSON, an individual, 
d/b/a Jim's Ribs; TERRY PANTELAKIS, 
an individual, d/b/a Jewelers 
& Loans and sales, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No. 880302-CA 
Case No. 880292-CA 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO REHEARING 
The Respondent REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT . LAKE CITY 
(hereinafter "RDA") respectfully upon request of the Court 
submits its Responsive Brief to the Petition for Rehearing 
filed by Appellants in this matter. 
POINT I 
THE COURT HAS FULLY CONSIDERED THE SPECIFIC ARGU-
MENTS RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR REHEARING IN THE 
EXHAUSTIVE DECISION FILED IN THIS MATTER. 
The arguments addressed by the Appellants in their 
Petition for Rehearing of this matter entirely overlooked the 
fact that this Court has determined that the stipulated 
agreement was, indeed, subject to two conditions precedent to 
its efficacy. Either the ADL would be signed by Lincoln 
Property within thirty (30) days from the date of the Order 
and additional sums of $76,450 would be paid into the Court or 
the Defendant Landowners will have withdrawn all or part of 
the $275,220 deposited with the Clerk of the Court. 
The Appellants entirely overlook the Court's lengthy 
consideration of the fact that the contract and agreement were 
subject to those conditions precedent. Those conditions 
precedent did not occur. Because they did not occur, the 
Redevelopment Agency never obtained immediate occupancy of the 
premises and they also never obtained by virtue of the 
Landowners' nonwithdrawal of the sums, any assurance that the 
Landowners would not, at a trial on the merits of the case, 
contest the RDA's right to condemn and acquire their property. 
By virtue of the non-occurrence of either or both of the 
conditions precedent, the RDA was faced with the proposition 
that at the time of the trial on just compensation, the 
Appellants herein were totally unrestricted in their ability 
to contest the right to acquire the property by eminent 
domain. Indeed, the RDA opened the trial of this matter by a 
proffer of evidence designed to establish a prima facie case 
of the right of the Agency to acquire the property. That 
entire presentation of evidence was itself required because 
the Appellants herein had not withdrawn the deposited funds 
and had, therefore, retained their right to resist the 
condemnation of their property. Appellants Petition for 
Rehearing argues that the giving up of the owners' defense to 
the Plaintiff's right to take constituted consideration for 
which they should receive the interest accruing on the 
deposited funds. That argument simply fails because there is 
nothing in the stipulation or the Order of Immediate Occupancy 
that provided that if the funds were not withdrawn from the 
Court or the Order of Immediate Occupancy became effective, 
the RDA would obtain from the Landowners a relinquishment of 
their right to contest the condemnation. 
The specific provisions of the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, based upon the oral stipulation of the parties 
reads as follows: 
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(e) gasecj Up0i i the ter ms and conditions of the 
oral stipulation made to the Cour t, the Court does 
hereby enter and Order of Immediate Occupancy that 
the subject property is sought for uses by the 
public in connection with and as part of a redeve-
lopment project authorized and approved by the City 
Council of Salt Lake City and the Redevelopment 
Agency uf !;\ilt Lake city, and the plaintiff is 
authorized to take immediate possession of said 
property and continue in possession of the same 
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of 
just compensation which, subject to the terms and 
provisions herein, is the only issue which may be 
raised in this action as provided in Section 78-34-
9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Plaintiff 
or its agents may do such work thereon as may be 
required for the purposes for which said property is 
sought to be condemned including, but not limited 
to, demolition of existing structures, without 
interference by defendants or any of defendants' 
partners, agents, or employees, however, no demoli-
tion of the existing tenants pursuant to said Order 
of Immediate Occupancy will occur until the defen-
dants have either withdrawn part or all of the 
$275,220.00 deposited with the Clerk of the Court as 
provided herein or have received payment from David 
Mortensen through the Redevelopment Agency " ' * 
$76,450.00 as herein provided. 
(R 237-238) (emphasis added) 
A1 < !M (»! K\V I , i • i IM. f v i mb d f provi-
sions of '.;;f Order ? Immediate Occupancy became ineffectual 
by the failure of: either m one of the two conditions prece-
i f i in t" I n 111 i in j i I I 11 I  1.11 in 111 > w i in (< i i i e 1 d 11 in < • 11 I I in i" ji . - > contest 
tht condemnation of their property. Therefore, :t Landowners 
,-'iit» no* entitled f the interest - iunus because they 
i J i 'i *j in if 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 mi I 11 I I in i i< 11 1 1 1 i e t * Tnterest. 
II if. t i n i •i il 11 i 1 the1 RI)A, 11) 11, s Respondent Brief, 
indicated a willingness either to have the Ordet nun pin tunc 
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effective and pay the interest agreed to but with the atten-
dant right to receive possession of and the income from the 
property retroactive to the date the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy was entered into subject to the conditions prece-
dent. But that offer was made only because in the Landowners' 
opening brief they made the proffer to tender the rental of 
approximately $43,000 in exchange for the interest of $58,000. 
The RDA was attempting merely to compromise and settle the 
issue. The Court has determined, as a matter of law, that the 
Order of Immediate Occupancy became ineffectual by the failure 
of the conditions precedent. It would not be within the 
Court's prerogative to now retroactively enforce a proffered 
settlement made by the RDA after the Appellants had taken 
their best shot at an award which would include both and have 
apparently lost. 
POINT XI 
THE ARGUMENTS RAISED CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
§11-19-23.9 INCLUDES EXPERT WITNESS FEES IN THE 
DEFINITION OF COSTS HAS BEEN FULLY RAISED BY THE 
APPELLANT IN THE ORIGINAL BRIEFS. 
The identical arguments asserted in the Petition for 
Rehearing were briefed and presented to the Court on pages 37-
42 of the Appellants original Brief. The Court's decision 
regarding costs is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
decisions interpreting similar statutes and the decisions of 
4 
other jurisdictions which have considered this issue. In 
addition, it would be err for this Court to award the costs 
requested by Appellants in this matter since the statute 
provides that those costs are permissive and discretionary 
with the Trial Court. (See, J?edfevelopjnent Agency of Roy v. 
Jones, 743 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah Ctp. App. 1987).) It is also 
respectfully submitted that the decision in People v. Bowman, 
343 P.2d 267, 269 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) and Andrews v. 
Kingsbury Gen. Improvement Dist. No. 2, 436 P.2d 813, 814-15 
(Nev. 1968) are persuasive authority in support of Court's 
decision. 
For the Court's convenience a copy of the opinion on 
which rehearing is sought as well as the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and the applicable statutory provision involved is 
attached for the Court's reference. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^^ day of December, 1989. 
/Wytf. 
Harold A. Hintze 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City, a public entity. 
Plaintiff/ 
v. 
Ellen K. Daskalas, an 
individual/ d/b/a The Pawn 
Shop, a Utah corporation; 
and Terry Pantelakis# an 
individual, d/b/a AAA 
Jewelers & Loans, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and 
Juanita Irene Burge; Robert D. 
Barrows/ Jr.; Beatrice Irene 
Barrows/ et al.# 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City, a public entity. 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
Jyanita Irene 3yrge; Robert Pt 
Bgrrpwgf jrt; 3e9trj.ce Irene 
Barrows: Ellen K. Daskalas, an 
individual d/b/a The Pawn Shop; 
The Pawn Shop, a Utah 
corporation; James Anderson# 
an individual d/b/a Jim's Ribs; 
Terry Pantelakis, an 
individual/ d/b/a AAA Jewelers; 
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a 
Utah corporation/ 
Defendants and Appellants. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880302-CA 
F I L E D 
Hoontn 
0#rk"3j^w Court 
U*t\ C#uit t< Appeals 
Case No. 880292-CA 
Third District/ Salt Lake County-
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
EXHIBIT 
Attorneys: Brant H. Wall and Jerome H. Mooney, III, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellants Daskalas, The Pawn Shop, and 
Pantelakis; 
John T. Evans, Salt Lake City, for Appellants and 
Respondents Burge, Barrows and Barrows; 
Harold A. Hintze, Provo, for Respondent 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Greenwood. 
GARFF, Judge: 
This consolidated case arises out of the attempt of plaintiff 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City (RDA) to condemn property 
located on Block 57 owned by defendants Burge, Barrows, and 
Barrows (Owners) and leased by defendants Daskalas, and 
Pantelakis (Tenants). In Case No. 880302-CA, Owners appeal the 
trial court's denial of (1) payment to them of interest on funds 
deposited by RDA with the court, and (2) expert witness fees and 
trial costs. In Case No. 870236-CA, Tenants appeal the trial 
court's determinations (1) that Tenants had no compensable 
leasehold interest at the time of the condemnation, and (2) that 
Tenants are liable for Owners' attorney fees under their lease 
agreements. We affirm in part, but remand for determination of 
the amount of attorney fees. 
About August 1, 1981, Tenants leased premises on Block 57 
from Owners under separate but identical written lease 
agreements. These agreements granted Tenants five-year leases 
with options to renew for another five years, and contained 
"condemnation clauses" which provided, in the event the property 
was condemned, that the leases were terminable at will by either 
party. The agreements also provided that Owners would receive 
attorney fees if they were required to enforce the lease 
provisions. 
In connection with its role in redeveloping portions of 
downtown Salt Lake City in 1984, RDA chose Lincoln Property 
Company (Lincoln) to redevelop Block 57. By 1985, RDA had 
acquired some property on the block, but not enough for Lincoln 
to begin construction of the redevelopment project. Seven 
landowners filed suit, separate from this action, contesting 
their inclusion within the redevelopment area. The trial court, 
in the separate action, ruled that RDA did not have authority to 
condemn the property. This ruling created a serious impediment 
ooftOA*)/^Q9-CA 2 
to Lincoln's ability to develop Block 57, and gave the landowners 
who contested RDA's condemnation authority considerable 
negotiating advantage, Lincoln became increasingly discouraged 
with its ability to put together a sufficiently large 
redevelopment site and indicated to RDA that it would continue 
with the project only if it could be assured of acquiring the 
entire northern one-third of Block 57. Meanwhile, many of the 
other landowners on Block 57 were desperate to sell their rapidly 
deteriorating property to Lincoln, and many had signed options to 
that effect. 
On June 21, 1985, RDA initiated the present condemnation 
action against Owners and Tenants in an effort to insure that 
Lincoln would have the property necessary to begin development. 
RDA initially offered defendants $273,000.00 for the property, 
which it stated was the property's fair market value. 
RDA filed a motion for an order of immediate occupancy of the 
premises on August 1, 1985. In response, Tenants' counsel 
executed a stipulation consenting to RDA's occupancy of the 
premises, based upon an agreement that Tenants could lease the 
property back from RDA. Owners, however, filed an answer 
objecting to the granting of the order of immediate occupancy, 
alleging that RDA did not have the power of eminent domain nor 
the need for immediate occupancy. Owners also claimed that 
Tenants had no right to any award of compensation from RDA. 
Tenants filed an answer, putting at issue the question of damages 
only. 
RDA's and Owners' motions were noticed up for hearing on 
August 13, 1985. Tenants failed to appear at this hearing. 
Nevertheless, RDA, Owners, and the neighboring landowners, who 
were anxious to sell their property, stipulated to the entry of 
an order of immediate occupancy. The court denied Owners' motion 
for an award of expert witness fees and other trial preparation 
costs and, despite Tenants' absence, incorporated into its order 
the provisions of Owners' motion which stated that Tenants had no 
right or claim to compensation. 
The stipulation giving RDA immediate occupancy, entered by 
the court on August 16, 1985, was contingent upon the following 
requirements: 
First, RDA was to deposit one hundred percent of the 
property's appraised value, $275,220.00, with the court. This 
money was to be invested at the rate of eleven and one-half 
percent per annum while held by the court. Owners could withdraw 
any portion of the deposited funds, plus interest, at any time, 
but such a withdrawal would constitute a waiver of any and all 
fi80302/292-CA 3 
defenses they might have as to RDA's ability to condemn the 
property. 
Second, RDA was to submit to Lincoln an agreement for 
distribution of land for private development (ADL), which was to 
be signed by both RDA and Lincoln within thirty days. Within 
thirty days of the signing of the ADL, RDA was to pay to Owners 
additional compensation of $76,450.00 from funds that would 
otherwise have been paid to neighboring landowners. Even if 
these events did not occur, the order would become effective if 
Owners withdrew any of the funds deposited with the court, and 
Owners would be required to immediately relinquish possession of 
the property. 
Tenants filed their answer on August 22, 1985, claiming an 
interest in the deposited funds. On August 23, 1985, Tenants' 
counsel objected to the portion of the August 16 order denying 
Tenants compensation, alleging that he had not been properly 
notified of the August 13, 1985 hearing. Owners answered 
Tenants' objection, stating that they had hand-carried notice of 
their motion to Tenants' attorney's new office at least five days 
prior to the hearing and, even if Tenants had appeared, that they 
would have had no right to participate in the condemnation 
proceeds. Tenants' objection was noticed up for hearing on 
October 11, and then was continued to November 1, 1985. The 
court never ruled on Tenants' objection. 
Meanwhile, on October 11, 1985, RDA filed a certificate of 
readiness for trial. On October 25, 1985, Owners filed a motion 
for summary judgment, asserting that Tenants were not entitled to 
share in any condemnation award. Tenants opposed this motion, 
arguing that they were entitled to the capitalized value of their 
lease, known as "bonus value." The court heard Tenants' motion 
on November 1, 1985, but continued Owners' motion for summary 
judgment and, at Tenants' request, froze the funds deposited by 
RDA with the court until Tenants' rights were determined. 
Lincoln and RDA did not sign the ADL as provided for in the 
August 16 stipulation, so the conditions set forth in the 
stipulation never came about and the order of immediate 
occupancy, dependent upon the conditions, never became effective. 
On February 10, 1987, the court heard the issues between 
Owners and Tenants and granted Owners' motion for summary 
judgment, ruling, as a matter of law, that Tenants did not have 
any compensable interest aside from the value of any improvements 
they might have made on the property. The court also ordered 
that Tenants pay Owners' attorney fees pursuant to the lease 
agreements. 
ftft0302/292-CA 4 
The issue of the fair market value of the property was 
litigated in a jury trial which began on February 23/ 1987. 
RDA had offered Owners $275/220.00 for the property/ but Owners 
asserted that the property was worth $660/000.00. The jury 
found that the property was worth $305/800.00. Tenants did not 
appear and did not proffer any evidence as to the value of any 
improvements they might have made to the property. 
On March 15, 1987/ Owners moved: (1) for a new trial on 
the issue of just compensation; (2) for the court to lift the 
freeze on the money deposited with the court; and (3) for the 
court to order that the money, including accrued interest/ be 
paid to Owners. The court denied this motion and ordered that 
the funds be returned to RDA. Consequently, Owners never 
withdrew any of the funds deposited with the court pursuant to 
the August 16, 1985 stipulation. 
At this time# Tenants were still occupying the premises 
and making rent payments to Owners under the terms of the lease 
agreements. The court ordered Tenants to continue paying rent 
to Owners until RDA obtained possession of the property. 
On March 18/ 1987/ at the trial court's request/ Owners 
submitted an affidavit setting forth their attorney fees 
incurred in defending against Tenants1 claims. This affidavit 
indicated that Owners' attorney spent 133 hours at $100.00 per 
hour, for a total of $13/300.00, and itemized additional costs 
and expenses of $2,130.00. Tenants filed an objection to the 
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, order, judgment, 
and affidavit. 
On March 25, 1987, a hearing was held to determine the 
amount of attorney fees that should be awarded to Owners. RDA 
proffered evidence explaining its need for immediate occupancy 
of the property because there was still a question as to 
whether RDA had the power to condemn Block 57. Owners moved to 
include as costs $18,402.67 of fees allegedly paid to five 
expert witnesses, three of whom had been called to testify at 
trial, and for an award of the interest on the funds deposited 
by RDA pursuant to the order of immediate occupancy. The trial 
court ordered RDA to pay Owners* court costs and attorney fees 
incurred in establishing the fair market value of the property, 
affirmed its order that Tenants were to pay Owners' attorney 
fees incurred in defending the action against Tenants, and 
found that Owners were entitled to rent payments until the 
property was turned over to RDA. It denied Owners' requests 
for payment of the interest accrued on the money filed by RDA 
with the court pursuant to the August 16, 1985 stipulation, and 
payment by RDA of Owners' expert witness fees and associated 
expenses. 
fifi0302/292-CA 5 
Owners then submitted supplemental affidavits supporting 
their request for attorney fees and costs. Tenants filed an 
opposing affidavit/ alleging that attorney fees for enforcement 
of the lease provisions should not have exceeded $1/000.00. 
On May 28/ 1987/ the court entered its conclusions of law, 
but did not make any factual findings. It ordered that RDA pay 
Owners $305/800.00 plus a reasonable attorney fee of $10/933.00 
with interest/ and costs of $332.70. It found that Tenants 
were not entitled to any compensation for their leasehold 
interests but ordered that they could present evidence at trial 
of any improvements made to the property for which they could 
be compensated. It also ordered that Tenants pay Owners 
$9/000.00 for attorney fees. 
On May 28/ 1987/ the trial court denied Owners1 motion for 
a new trial/ ordered Tenants to continue to pay rent to Owners 
until RDA took possession of the property/ and awarded title to 
the property to RDA upon its payment of $305/800.00 plus 
interest and attorney fees to Owners. 
On June 5# 1987/ Owners acknowledged that RDA had paid 
them $305/800.00 plus $10/933.00 in attorney fees/ $833.05 in 
interest/ and $332.70 in costs. That same day# the court 
entered the final order of condemnation and RDA obtained 
possession of the property. 
Both Owners and Tenants appeal the trial court's judgment/ 
raising the following issues: 
(1) Is RDA required to pay to Owners interest on 
deposited funds pursuant to paragraphs 1(a)* and 1(d)2 of 
the stipulation? 
1. Section 1(a) reads as follows: 
Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of the 
Court upon signing of this Order of 
Immediate Occupancy the sum of $275/220.00/ 
being 100% of the appraised value of the 
subject property based upon a written 
appraisal obtained by plaintiff. While 
(continued) 
2. Section 1(d) of the contract states that: 
This Order of Occupancy shall not be 
effective unless or until/ (1) the ADL is 
signed by Lincoln Property and the 
(continued) 
Aft0302/292-CA 6 
(2) Did the trial court err in ruling that RDA*s filing 
of the condemnation action terminated Tenants1 leasehold 
interests# thus depriving Tenants of the right to a full 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages? 
(footnote 1 continued) 
retained by the Clerk of the Court, said 
funds shall be invested by the Clerk at the 
highest interest available for federally 
insured accounts. The plaintiff/ however, 
agrees and warrants that said funds will 
earn interest at an effective rate of 11.5 
annual percentage rate for the term of which 
they are held by the Clerk of the Court, not 
to exceed a period of three years from the 
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and 
that any shortfall or difference between the 
actual interest earned by virtue of the 
Clerk's investment and the 11.5 annual 
percentage rate shall be paid by plaintiff 
to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows 
upon demand as herein provided. While said 
funds are on deposit with the Clerk of the 
Court/ all or any part of said funds may be 
withdrawn hereafter at the option of 
defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows, or 
any of them, upon a written demand of Burge, 
Barrows and Barrows or their counsel of 
record. The withdrawal of all or any part 
of said deposited funds by defendants Burge, 
Barrows and Barrows shall constitute a 
waiver of any and all defenses to the taking 
by condemnation of the subject property as 
provided in Section 78-34-9/ Utah Code Ann.# 
1953/ as amended, except the issue of just 
compensation which shall then be the sole 
issue reserved for trial. 
(footnote 2 continued) 
Redevelopment Agency within thirty (30) days 
from date hereof, and the sum of $76,450.00 
above provided has been paid pursuant to the 
terms and provisions herein, or (2) the 
defendant landowners have withdrawn all or 
part of the $275,220.00 deposited with the 
Clerk of the Court as herein provided. 
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(3) Are Owners entitled to reimbursement by RDA for 
expert witness fees and other trial preparation expenses? 
(4) Under the terms of Tenants' lease agreements/ should 
Owners be awarded attorney fees for defending against Tenants1 
damage claims, or did this right end if and when the filing of 
the condemnation action terminated Tenants* leasehold 
interests? If Owners were properly awarded attorney fees 
against Tenants, was the award reasonable and proper under the 
pleadings and circumstances, and adequately supported by the 
record? 
(5) Are Owners entitled to reimbursement by RDA of costs 
and attorney fees on appeal? 
(6) Are Owners entitled to reimbursement by Tenants for 
attorney fees on appeal because Tenants' appeal is frivolous? 
I. INTEREST ON FUNDS DEPOSITED WITH COURT 
Owners claim that the trial court erred in denying their 
request for accrued interest on the funds deposited by RDA 
pursuant to the stipulation. They assert, instead, that this 
document is a sixty-day option contract with the interest 
constituting consideration. RDA, on the other hand, interprets 
the document as an order of immediate occupancy and argues that 
Owners have no claim to the interest because RDA never received 
occupancy under the stipulation. 
The document at issue is an agreement, stipulated to by 
the parties, which was read in open court, adopted by the 
court, and entered on August 16, 1985. It conditioned the 
granting of RDA's motion for an order of immediate occupancy 
upon the occurrence of the following conditions: (1) payment 
by RDA to the court clerk of one hundred percent of the 
assessed value of the property, $275,220.00; and (2) either (a) 
execution by RDA of a property distribution agreement (ADL) 
with Lincoln within thirty days, and then, within another 
thirty days, payment to Owners of $76,540.00 additional 
compensation funded by neighboring landowners; or (b) 
withdrawal by Owners of any or all of the funds deposited by 
RDA with the court clerk. Owners' withdrawal of any of the 
deposited funds would result in their waiver of "any and all 
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject property 
. . . except the issue of just compensation which shall then be 
the sole issue reserved for trial." 
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In determining whether the August 16, 1985 stipulation is 
an order of immediate occupancy or an option contract, we apply 
the rules of contract interpretation. We look at the contract 
in its entirety, in accordance with its purpose, giving effect 
to all of its parts insofar as is possible. Larrabee v. Royal 
Dairy Prods. Co., 614 P.2d 160, 162-63 (Utah 1980)- To the 
extent that the interpretation of the contract is a question of 
law, we need not defer to the trial court's conclusions. Jones 
v. Hinkle. 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). If the document, 
itself, is ambiguous, then parol evidence may be used in 
arriving at an interpretation. Power Svs. and Controls. Inc. 
v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9-10 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). In evaluating parol evidence, however, we defer to the 
trial court's factual findings because of its advantaged 
position in ascertaining the credibility of witnesses. See 
Fashion Place Inv.. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County. 776 P*2d 941, 943 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). We note that 
[i]t is a fundamental rule that in the 
construction of contracts the courts may 
look not only to the language employed, but 
to the subject-matter and the surrounding 
circumstances, and may avail themselves of 
the same light which the parties possessed 
when the contract was made. To ascertain 
that intention, regard must be had to the 
nature of the instrument itself, the 
condition of the parties executing it, and 
the objects which they had in view. 
Kintner v. Harr. 408 P.2d 487, 494 (Mont. 1965) (citations 
omitted); pee also Berman v. Berman. 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
Thus, to assist in interpreting the language of the 
contract, we examine the circumstances surrounding the entry of 
the document and the purposes behind its execution. At the time 
of the hearing, Lincoln was attempting to develop at least the 
northern third of Block 57, but could not proceed unless it had 
access to a sufficiently large piece of property. RDA had filed 
condemnation actions against all Block 57 property owners, but 
had not obtained occupancy of much of the property. Five 
property owners located on the southern two-thirds of the block 
and Owners had filed lawsuits contesting RDA's condemnation 
power. RDA had filed an interlocutory appeal contesting an 
adverse ruling in its lawsuit against the other five property 
owners. At the time of this hearing, that appeal and its 
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associated lawsuit were still pending, making it uncertain 
whether RDA did, in fact, have the power to condemn property on 
Block 57, 
Lincoln's commitment to develop Block 57 was contingent upon 
its execution, with RDA, of the ADL. Lincoln would not sign the 
ADL unless it was certain that RDA could immediately obtain 
occupancy of at least the northern third of Block 57. Because of 
the uncertainty surrounding RDA's condemnation authority, Lincoln 
was rapidly losing interest in pursuing the project at all. 
Thus, time was of the essence. Additionally, other adjoining 
landowners were eager to sell their property to RDA as soon as 
possible because of the rapidly declining property values on 
Block 57. Consequently, they were willing to pay Owners some of 
the compensation they would have otherwise received for their 
property in order to induce Owners to settle with RDA. Thus, the 
parties' stipulation was entered into as an attempt to facilitate 
RDA's arrangement with Lincoln. 
RDA, pursuant to the August 16, 1985 stipulation, deposited 
$275,220.00 with the clerk of the court. However, Lincoln 
subsequently withdrew from the project, so the ADL was never 
executed. Consequently, the court did not enter an order for 
immediate occupancy, and RDA never occupied Owners' property 
pursuant to the stipulation. 
An order of immediate occupancy permits the condemning 
authority to occupy property pending a condemnation action. It 
is an interlocutory order, entered pendente XjJt£# which only 
authorizes the State to take immediate possession until a final 
adjudication is held on the merits. Utah State Road Comm'n v. 
Fribero, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984). 
To grant an order of immediate occupancy under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-34-9 (1987), the court must require, as a condition 
precedent, that the condemning authority deposit at least 
seventy-five percent of the appraised value of the property it 
seeks to condemn with the clerk of the court. The landowner is 
then free, at any time, to withdraw the money filed with the 
court clerk. If he does, however, he forfeits his right to 
challenge the condemning authority1s power to condemn his 
property, and may only dispute the final amount of compensation. 
This amount may be established pursuant to an evidentiary hearing 
separate from the granting of the order of immediate occupancy, 
and includes eight percent per annum interest on the difference 
between the amount finally awarded and the amount the condemning 
agency originally deposited with the court clerk. Interest 
10 
accrues from the earlier date of either the condemning 
authority's taking possession of the property or the entry of the 
order of immediate occupancy/ until the date of judgment, Utah 
County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983). 
The purpose behind the parties* stipulation was to permit 
RDA to immediately occupy Owners' property pending determination 
of its condemnation authority and the value of the property. 
Like an order of immediate occupancy, the stipulation did not 
purport to finally set the amount of compensation Owners should 
receive. 
The court required two conditions precedent to its granting 
of an order of immediate occupancy under the stipulation. The 
first condition required RDA to deposit one hundred percent of 
the appraised value of the property, twenty-five percent more 
than required for an order of immediate occupancy under section 
78-34-9. The first alternative under the second condition, that 
RDA and Lincoln sign the ADL and then pay Owners additional 
compensation, is unique to the stipulation and has no counterpart 
under section 78-34-9. However, the second alternative, like the 
statute, provides that if Owners were to withdraw the funds, they 
would forfeit the right to litigate RDA's condemnation authority. 
The stipulation required eleven and one-half percent per 
annum interest to be paid upon the entire appraised value of the 
property deposited with the court, from the date of the 
stipulation to the earlier of either the date of final 
determination of the fair market value of the property or the 
expiration of three years. Section 78-34-9 only requires that 
eight percent interest be paid on the balance of the fair market 
value of the property not deposited with the court from the date 
of the granting of the order of immediate occupancy or the date 
of entry on the property, whichever occurs earlier, to the date 
of final determination of the value of the property. Therefore, 
the stipulated terms in regard to interest are substantially more 
favorable to Owners than statutorily required. 
In the stipulation, the court set a sixty-day time limit for 
the conditions precedent to occur. This is consistent with the 
statute's allowance for the trial court to set reasonable time 
limits for compliance with its terms. 
In summary, the parties' stipulation closely parallels the 
requirements and purpose for an order of immediate occupancy 
pursuant to section 78-34-9. It diverges from the statutory 
requirements only in terms which are substantially more 
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favorable to Owners than required. We conclude that the 
parties incorporated these terms to induce Owners, who were 
clearly unwilling otherwise, to enter quickly into the 
agreement with RDA. 
On the other hand, Owners contend that this stipulation is 
really an option agreement for which the accrued interest was 
to serve as consideration. This court, relying upon 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 25 (1981), has recently 
defined an option contract as a "promise which meets the 
requirements for the formation of a contract and limits the 
promisor's power to revoke an offer." Property Assistance 
Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 25 (1981)). We 
have indicated that: 
[t]wo elements exist in such a contract: 
(1) an offer to sell, which does not 
become a contract until accepted, and (2) 
a contract to leave the offer open for a 
specified time. Thus, by its terms, an 
option contract for real property requires 
one offer and acceptance of the exclusive 
right to purchase the property and another 
offer and acceptance for the actual 
transfer of the property. 
Id, (citations omitted). 
Because the stipulation very closely resembles a statutory 
order of immediate occupancy and not an option contract, we 
reject Owners* assertion and find that the stipulation should be 
interpreted as an order of immediate occupancy. 
It is undisputed that the first condition occurred when RDA 
deposited one hundred percent of the appraised value of the 
property with the court. However, neither alternative of the 
second condition occurred. RDA and Lincoln never executed the 
ADL and Owners, during the approximately eighty-five days the 
funds deposited with the court remained unfrozen, never withdrew 
any of the funds. This nonoccurrence of the conditions 
discharged RDA's duty to pay Owners the consideration recited 
under the stipulation, including interest. 
Although this is dispositive of Owners' claim to the accrued 
interest, we note additionally that under section 78-34-9, where 
there is no entry or occupation of the property by the condemning 
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agency, there is no entitlement to interest. See Oregon Short 
Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732, 735-36 (1905).3 
It is undisputed that RDA never occupied Owners' property 
pursuant to the stipulation, so Owners are not entitled to 
interest. 
In summary, we conclude that the interest provided for in 
section 1(a) of the parties• stipulation was consideration for 
taking possession of the property, not for a sixty-day option 
agreement, and that the conditions set forth in paragraph 1(d) of 
the stipulation are conditions precedent to enforcement of the 
entire agreement, rather than merely to the payment of interest. 
II. BONUS VALUE OF TENANTS* LEASEHOLD INTERESTS 
Tenants insist the trial court erred in finding that they 
were not entitled to any "bonus value"4 because their "leases 
terminated as of the commencement of this action against the 
Defendants." They argue that at the time the action was filed, 
their leases had approximately thirteen unexpired months, and 
that they later renewed the leases for additional five-year 
terms. They maintain that they are entitled to bonus value 
payments because they would have to pay much more rent elsewhere, 
and demand a hearing to determine the amount of bonus value to 
which they are entitled. 
Owners assert that Tenants9 lease agreements were terminated 
as of the date of service of RDA's condemnation complaint, and 
that Tenants' lease provisions do not allow for bonus value 
payments. 
To resolve this issue, we look to the terms of the lease 
agreements. In doing so, we follow the same rules of contract 
3. Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732 
(1905) interprets a previous version of the statute, but the 
operative provisions are sufficiently similar to the present 
version of the statute for the case to be relevant. 
4. Bonus value occurs "whenever the capitalized then fair rental 
value for the remaining term of the lease, plus the value of any 
renewal right, exceeds the capitalized value of the rental the 
lease specifies." Alamo Land and Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 242 U.S. 
295, 96 S. Ct. 910, 916 (1976). See also Garibaldi v. Oklahoma 
Indus. Fin. Co.. 543 P.2d 555, 558 (Okla. 1975). 
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interpretation as specified in section I. The relevant portions 
of Tenants' lease agreements read as follows: 
In the event said premises, or any part 
thereof, or the whole or any part of the 
said building shall be taken by right of 
eminent domain or shall be taken for any 
street or public use or the action of public 
authorities after the execution and before 
the termination hereof, this Lease may, at 
the election of Lessor or Lessee, be 
terminated: provided, however, in such 
event, Lessee shall be entitled to 
compensation for improvements made to said 
premises, in an amount equal to the 
compensation received by Lessor in respect 
thereof and as a result thereof, regardless 
of the termination of this Lease. 
(Emphasis added.) 
By the terms of this lease, either the Lessor or the Lessee 
may terminate the lease upon the taking of the premises by the 
right of eminent domain. See 51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 98 
(1968). "The generally accepted rule is that if the condemning 
authority takes an estate in fee simple absolute in all of the 
real property covered by the lease, the lease thereupon 
terminates.- Peaverton Urban Renewal Agency v» ypning, 53 or. 
App. 842, 632 P.2d 1359, 1360 (1981); &£& also Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Bradley, 205 Kan. 242, 468 P.2d 95, 98 (1970); 
51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 98 (1968). Thus, in a total 
taking, any right which the lessee may have to share in the 
condemnation award becomes vested at the time of the taking, 
absent an agreement to the contrary. Garibaldi v. Oklahoma 
Indus. Fin. Co.. 543 P.2d 555, 558 (Okla. 1975); Beaverton 
Urban Renewal Agency, 632 P.2d at 1362. The time of the taking 
is generally considered to be the time at which the condemning 
authority actually takes possession of the property, not the 
time at which the initial complaint is served. See Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 468 P.2d at 99. Therefore, if not previously 
terminated, Tenants1 lease ended on June 7, 1987, the date on 
which RDA ultimately took possession of the premises. At this 
time, Tenants1 rights to bonus value, if any, became vested. 
There is no evidence in the record that either Owners or 
Tenants terminated the leases on the date RDA initiated its 
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condemnation action. Instead/ Tenants continued to occupy the 
premises and Owners continued to receive rent payments from 
Tenants. Approximately thirteen months later# on July 31, 
1985/ the original lease expired. Tenants remained in 
possession after this time# and continued paying rent at the 
contract amount to Owners. 
Tenants claim that they properly renewed the lease 
agreements and that/ because the second five-year term had not 
fully elapsed at the time RDA took possession of the premises/ 
they were entitled to the bonus value of the remaining leases. 
Owners/ on the other hand/ argue that Tenants never properly 
extended or renewed the lease agreements and were simply 
month-to-month tenants who had no bonus value rights. 
The renewal provisions of the lease agreements state: 
Lessor grants to Lessee an option to renew 
this Lease for a period of Five (5) years 
after the expiration of the term of this 
Lease at a rental to be negotiated at 
least si?ty (60) flays prior to the 
expiration Qf this frease/ with all other 
terms and conditions of the renewal lease 
to be the?same as those herein. To 
exercise this option* Lessee must give 
Lessor written notice of intention to 
extend at least ninety (90) days before 
this lease expires. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Under the contract/ Tenants were required to give Owners 
written notice of their intent to extend the lease at least 
ninety days before it expired. Tenants assert that they mailed 
notifications of their intent to renew the lease to Owners 
during this period of time. However/ they were unable to 
produce any evidence at trial that they had done so. Owners 
testified that they never received any such notice. Neither 
side disputes the facts that Owners never replied to this 
alleged notification and that a new rental was not negotiated 
between the parties at least sixty days before the lease 
terminated. The trial court specifically found that Tenants 
had not timely notified Owners of their intent to renew the 
lease. We will not set aside the trial court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous and against the 
clear weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite 
1 K 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a); Reifl vt Mutual of Qmghg InSt QOt, 776 P.2d 896, 
899-900 (Utah ,1989). "Where evidence is controverted, we 
assume that the trial judge believed those aspects of the 
evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from them that 
support his decision.- pyjxen fr Christopher* Architects vf 
Elton, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 51 (Ct. App. 1989); see also IFG 
Leasing Co. v. Gordon, Hansen, and Nelson, 776 P.2d 607, 617 
(Utah 1989). After a review of the record, we do not find the 
trial court's determination that Tenants failed to timely renew 
the lease to be clearly erroneous. 
The lease agreements further state that: 
No holding over by Lessee, however long 
continued, shall operate to renew or extend 
this Lease without Lessor's written 
consent. If Lessee holds possession of said 
premises after the term of this Lease or any 
renewal term thereof, Lessee shall become a 
tenant from month to month, at the rent 
payable in the last installment during the 
last month of the term of this Lease, and 
upon the terms herein specified, and shall 
continue to be such tenant until the tenancy 
shall be terminated by Lessor or until 
Lessee shall have given Lessor written 
notice of at least one (1) month of Lessee's 
intention to terminate the tenancy. 
Under this provision, Tenants' holding over of the property 
did not create a new lease but resulted only in a 
month-to-month tenancy which terminated on February 2, 1987, 
when Owners gave Tenants written notice of their intention to 
terminate the lease. Tenants' month-to-month tenancy had no 
bonus value because they were not entitled to the specified 
rental amount for any more than one month at a time. 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court in finding that Tenants 
had no bonus value under their leases, and that, as a 
consequence, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the amount of the bonus value. 
III. EXPERT WITNESS FEES 
AND OTHER TRIAL PREPARATION EXPENSES 
Owners appeal the trial court's denial of their request for 
reimbursement of expert witness fees and other trial 
preparation expenses. They argue that Utah Code Ann. 
880302/292-CA 16 
§ 11-19-23.9 (1986), which authorizes reimbursement of a 
landowner's costs and attorney fees in a condemnation action, 
also includes reimbursement for expert witness fees and other 
reasonably necessary trial preparation expenses. This is an 
issue of first impression in Utah. 
Owners argue that they have been deprived of 
constitutionally required "just compensation" for the taking of 
their property for public use because they have been required 
to expend a considerable portion of their award, which was 
founded on the fair market value of their property, for the 
services of expert witnesses and other reasonably necessary 
litigation expenses. They rely on the Florida Supreme Court's 
opinion in Pafle County v« Priqham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950) to 
support this point: 
We might, and do, add thereto the thought 
that Section 73.16, Florida Statutes 1941, 
F.S.A., which provides "All costs of 
proceedings shall be paid by the 
petitioner, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee . . . " should be 
construed in the light of Section 12 of 
our Declaration of Rights, F.S.A., which 
declares that private property shall not 
be taken "without iust compensation." 
(Italics supplied.) When so construed the 
language *A11 costs of proceedings . . . " 
must be held, in a proper case, to include 
fees of expert witnesses for the 
defendants. . • . 
Since the owner of private property 
sought to be condemned is forced into 
court by one to whom he owes no 
obligation, it cannot be said that he has 
received "just compensation" for his 
property if he is compelled to pay out of 
his own pocket the expenses of 
establishing the fair value of the 
property, which expenses in some cases 
could conceivably exceed such value. 
Dade County, 47 So. 2d at 604-05. 
Although the logic of the Florida court's interpretation 
of "just compensation" under Florida constitutional provisions 
appeals to a sense of fairness, it is well settled that "just 
AS0302/292-CA 17 
compensation- under the federal constitution is not so 
inclusive. Under the federal constitution, w[j]ust 
compensation is for the property and not to the owner. As a 
result, indirect costs to the property owner caused by the 
taking of his land are generally not part of the just 
compensation to which he is constitutionally entitled." United 
St9teS v, 3QdC9W CQt, 440 U.S. 202, 203, 99 S. Ct. 1066, 
1066-67 (1979) (quoting Mononaahela Navigation Co. v. United 
States, 148 U.S. 312, 326, 13 S. Ct. 622, 626, 37 L.Ed. 463 
(1893)). Therefore, attorney fees and other necessary 
expenses, including expert witness fees, are non-compensable as 
-just compensation.- 9.88 Acres of Land v. State ex. rel. 
Highway Deo't, 274 A.2d 139, 140-41 (Del. 1971); see also 
County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz. 98 Cal. Rptr. 454, 490 P.2d 
1142, 1147 (1971); State v. Davis. 499 P.2d 663, 667 (Haw. 
1972). Instead, compensation for such costs incurred by a 
landowner in a condemnation action is a matter of legislative 
prerogative and must be provided for by statute.7 Department 
of Transp. v. Winston Container Co.. 263 S.E.2d 830, 831 (N.C. 
ct. App. 1980); £££ hiso Schwartz vt western Power & ggs Cot, 
208 Kan. 844, 494 P.2d 1113, 1116-17 (1972); Gavlord v. State 
ex rel. Deo't of Highways, 540 P.2d 558, 562 (Okla. 1975). 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9 (1986), which provides for 
reimbursement of the landowner's expenditures in a condemnation 
action, provides, in part: 
Within the project area an agency may: 
(2) acquire real property by eminent 
domain; but when the power of eminent domain 
is exercised under the provisions of the 
chapter and the party whose property is 
affected contests the matter in the district 
7. The Florida Supreme Court in Dade County v. Brioham. 47 So. 
2d 602 (Fla. 1950), interpreted its state constitutional 
provision for just compensation far more inclusively than the 
federal constitutional provision, finding that just 
compensation essentially includes all the landowners expenses 
incurred in defending a condemnation action, including expert 
witness fees. Because Owners have not specifically invoked our 
analogous constitutional provisions and have not briefed the 
issue of the extent of protection afforded to landowners under 
this provision, we do not address its interpretation in this 
opinion. Sfis state v. John. 770 P.2d 994, 997 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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court, the court may, in cases where the 
amount of the award exceeds the amount 
offered, award in addition to his just 
compensation, costs, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee as determined by 
the court. The court, or jury in cases 
tried before a jury, may also award a 
reasonable sum as compensation for the 
costs and expenses, if any, of relocating 
the owner whose property is acquired or a 
party conducting a business on such 
acquired property. 
In the present case, RDA acquired Owners' property by 
eminent domain. Owners contested the matter in district court, 
and the amount awarded Owners exceeded the amount initially 
offered to Owners by RDA. Therefore, under section 11-19-23.9, 
the court mav award to Owners, "in addition to [their] just 
compensation, costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee as 
determined by the court." I$l. We note that the award of costs 
under this section is permissive and discretionary with the 
court, Redevelopment Agency of ROY V. Jones# 743 p.2d 1233, 
1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), so Owners are not unquestionably 
entitled to such an award. 
We also note that section 11-19-23.9 does not define the 
term "costs." Owners, in an attempt to define the term 
"costs," cite Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-34-16 and -19 (1986), which 
provide for full reimbursement of all reasonable and necessary 
expenses actually incurred by a condemnee. These sections are 
not helpful because neither is applicable to the present case: 
Section 78-34-16 refers to a condemnation action which is filed 
and then abandoned by the condemning agency, while section 
78-34-19 applies to a concluded condemnation action in which 
the condemning authority fails to commence or complete 
construction on the subject property within a reasonable time. 
Further, the language authorizing the reimbursement in these 
statutes is far more inclusive than the term "costs." In 
section 78-34-16, the condemnee is to be reimbursed "in full 
for all reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by 
condemnee because of the filing of the action by condemner, 
including attorneys fees," and in section 78-34-19(2), for "all 
reasonable and necessary expenses actually incurred by the 
condemnee including attorney fees." 
The California court, in construing its condemnation 
statute, similarly observed that the statute did not specify 
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what items may be included as costs. It then ruled that costs 
are the same as those recoverable in ordinary civil actions. 
People v. Bowman, 343 P.2d 267, 269 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959). Nevada has approved the same construction in 
determining what costs are allowed under its condemnation 
statute. Andrews v. Kingsbury Gen. Improvement Dist. No. 2, 
436 P.2d 813, 814-15 (Nev. 1968). We, likewise, approve the 
same construction. 
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does 
not define Ncosts.H However, the generally accepted definition 
of HcostsM under this rule includes: 
. . . those fees which are required to 
be paid to the court and to witnesses, and 
for which the statutes authorize to be 
included in the judgment. 
There is a distinction to be understood 
between the legitimate and taxable "costs" 
and other "expenses" of litigation which may 
be ever so necessary, but are not properly 
taxable as costs. Consistent with that 
distinction', the courts hold that expert 
witnesses cannot be awarded extra 
compensation unless the statute expressly so 
provides. 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980) (footnotes 
omitted). Section 11-19-23.9 authorizes compensation for costs 
and attorney fees, but does not expressly provide for 
compensation for expert witnesses. We, therefore, conclude that 
expert witness fees are not reimbursable "costs." Consequently, 
the trial court ruled correctly in refusing to award Owners 
compensation for expert witness fees incurred in defending this 
condemnation action. We agree, however, with the Delaware 
court: "If an adjustment in the law of eminent domain is 
dictated by fairness in this connection, it is a matter for 
consideration and action by the [legislature]." 9,88 Acres <?f 
Land, 274 A.2d at 140. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES 
A. Tenants* Liability For Owners" Attorney Fees 
Tenants allege that the trial court erred in requiring them 
to pay attorney fees incurred by Owners in defending against 
their claims. They reason that: (1) they are not liable under 
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the lease agreements to pay the attorney fees because Owners 
deemed the lease void for purposes of determining their 
entitlement to bonus value and, thus, they cannot deem it to be 
valid for purposes of assessing attorney fees; and (2) Owners' 
claim for attorney fees was not raised in the pleadings and 
Tenants did not consent to amend the pleadings. Owners, however, 
contend that they are entitled to attorney fees both at the trial 
level and on appeal for issues raised by Tenants. Owners also 
demand attorney fees on appeal of its claims against RDA. 
Tenants' Liability Under The Lease Agreement 
MIn Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by 
statute or by contract." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985, 988 (Utah 1988)t If authorized by contract, then attorney 
fees are allowed only in accordance with the terms of the 
contract. Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 
643, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The portion of the lease agreements authorizing payment of 
attorney fees reads as follows: 
Lessee also agrees to pay all costs and 
attorney's fees and expenses that shall 
arise from enforcing the terms and 
provisions of this lease. 
Tenants claimed compensation for bonus value based upon 
their purported renewal of the lease for five years. However, 
they failed to comply with the conditions of the lease to 
effectively exercise their option to renew, and the lease 
precluded them from receiving bonus value payments. Owners 
successfully resisted their claim for compensation on the 
grounds that it was $ violation of the "terms and provisions of 
this lease." Thus, the Owners are contractually entitled to 
collect attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending 
against Tenants' claims because they were enforcing the lease 
terms. 
Tenants, relying upon BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 
456, 458 (Utah 1978), argue that a party who deems a contract 
void for one purpose cannot subsequently rely upon that 
contract to support another purpose. The circumstances in BLT 
Investment, however, are not applicable to the present case. 
One of the parties in BLT Investment rescinded a contract and 
then relied upon the same contract to attempt to collect 
attorney fees from the other party. Here, even though 
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Tenants' five-year lease term had expired/ the parties 
continued to maintain a landlord-tenant relationship on a 
month-to-month tenancy, as provided for in the original lease, 
until owners terminated the lease. However, Owners did not 
rescind the contract or declare it void. Consequently, the 
parties were entitled to rely upon the contractual terms, 
including the provisron for attorney fees, to determine their 
respective rights and responsibilities. See Cobabe v. 
Crawford, 117 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 26 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Tenants' Liability Under The Pleadings 
Tenants also argue that they are not liable for Owners* 
attorney fees, pursuant to Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, because Owners did not request attorney fees 
in their pleadings but only raised them in their motion for 
summary judgment.5 At trial, Tenants requested that Owners' 
affidavits supporting their requested fees not be admitted into 
evidence. The court denied Tenants' request, admitted both 
Owners' and Tenants' affidavits regarding attorney fees, and 
ruled that the pleadings could be amended to include attorney 
fees. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
pleadings to be amen led to conform to the evidence presented 
and the issues actually litigated by the parties. This rule, 
in part, states that! 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on 
the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court 
may allow the pleadings to be amended when 
the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court 
that the admission of such evidence would 
prejudice him in maintaining his action or 
defense upon the merits. 
Thus, pleadings may be amended even when evidence is objected 
to at trial on the ground that it raises issues not framed by 
the pleadings, fififi ftlso Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Wav 
5. Owners did not file a cross-claim for attorney fees in 
their answer to RDA's condemnation complaint because they filed 
their answer before Tenants asserted their claim. Tenants were 
put on notice that Owners were seeking attorney fees from them 
in Owners' motion for summary judgment. 
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Mktcr.. Ltd.. 753 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "Although 
Rule 15 . . . tends to favor the granting of leave to amend, the 
matter remains in the sound discretion of the trial court." 
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984) (footnote 
omitted). Therefore, the trial court was within its discretion 
in concluding that the pleadings could be amended to include 
attorney fees,6 even though not initially raised in the 
pleadings. 
Amount of Attorney Fee Award at the Trial Level 
Tenants argue that the trial court improperly awarded Owners 
attorney fees because counsel's affidavit, submitted by Owners, 
was insufficient to support the award. 
The calculation of reasonable attorney fees is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned 
absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank, 
764 P.2d at 988. However, an award made without adequate 
supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and must be overruled. !£.; Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 
1226, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
While findings of fact are unnecessary in connection with 
summary judgment decisions, a summary judgment is improper when 
material facts are disputed. See Taylor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 
P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "[W]here attorney fees are 
awarded to a prevailing party on summary judgment, the 
undisputed, material facts must establish, as a matter of law, 
that (1) the party is entitled to the award, and (2) the amount 
awarded is reasonable.H !£. at 169. 
Here, while summary judgment was appropriate in determining 
that Owners were entitled to an award of attorney fees, the facts 
are controverted as to the reasonableness of the award. 
6. The trial court's conclusion of law No. 8 reads: 
The presentation of the merits of this 
action will be subserved by amending the 
pleadings to raise the issues and to conform 
to the evidence as to claims by the owners 
against the tenants, which claims are set 
forth in the owners1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment and which should become part of the 
issues made by the pleadings herein by way 
of owners' cross-claim against the tenants. 
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Owners' attorney fee affidavits were quite detailed, 
specifying the work actually performed in connection with the 
litigation of issues raised by Tenants, and the number of hours 
required to perform this work. On the basis of these 
affidavits, Owners requested an award of between $5,000.00 and 
$13,300.00. However, Tenants' attorney filed an opposing 
affidavit which alleged that the issues involved were not 
complex, required little research, and should have taken little 
time. He stated tha': Owners should, therefore, be awarded no 
more than $500.00 to $1000.00 for these fees. 
It takes only one competent sworn statement to dispute the 
averments on the other side of the controversy and create an 
issue of fact. Reeves v. Geiav Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 
636, 640 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We find that Tenants' 
attorney's affidavit sufficiently disputes Owners' averments of 
fact to create an issue of fact. See D&L Supply v. Saurini, 
775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (adverse party must set forth 
specific facts in an affidavit or otherwise to raise any issue 
of fact); Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 
693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (the party opposing summary 
judgment must set forth specific facts in an affidavit that 
would be admissible as evidence). 
Because there is a dispute as to a material fact, we 
reverse the lower court's determination of the amount of 
attorney fees and remand for trial on that issue. The court 
should make factual findings to support its award. Reeves, 764 
P.2d at 640; Cabreral 694 P.2d at 625. 
Attorney Fees for Appeal 
Owners maintain that they are entitled to attorney fees 
for defending against Tenants' appeal on the grounds that 
Tenants' appeal is frivolous. While we agree that Tenants' 
issues on appeal are wholly without merit, we do not reach the 
issue of whether or not they are frivolous. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that 
the contractual obligation to pay 
attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a 
contract should include those incurred on 
appeal. • • • 
. . . We therefore adopt the rule of 
law that y provision for payment of 
attorney's fees in a contract includes 
attorney fees incurred by the prevailing 
party on appeal as well as at trial, if 
the action is brought to enforce the 
contract. . . . 
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Management Servs. v. Development Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 
(Utah 1980) (footnote omitted); see also Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 
P.2d 879# 881,(Utah 1988); Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408# 412 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Because Tenants1 issues on appeal all 
dealt with the interpretation and enforcement of Tenants1 lease 
agreements, Owners are entitled to reimbursement by Tenants of 
their attorney fees incurred on appeal. See Cobabe v. 
Crawford. 117 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27. We remand for purposes of 
determining the amount of a reasonable attorney fee. 
B. RDA's Liability For Owner's Attorney 
Fees Incurred on Appeal 
Owners argue that because Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9 
(1986) authorizes an award of attorney fees to condemnees, RDA 
should be be ordered to pay Owners' attorney fees necessarily 
incurred on appeal. Rule 34(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, however, states that "if a judgment or order is 
affirmed/ costs [including attorneys' fees] shall be taxed 
against the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment 
or order is reversed/ costs shall be taxed against the 
respondent unless otherwise ordered." 
Owners appealed the trial court's decision in RDA's favor 
on two major issues: (1) Owners' entitlement to interest paid 
into the court clerk's office pursuant to the August 16/ 1985 
stipulation, and (2) reimbursement for expert witness fees 
under Utatr-€ode Ann. § 11-34-29.9. We affirm the trial court's 
judaKr^ nt on Jboth of/these^Psues. Therefore/ Owners are not 
entitled to/attorney f^e^fm appeal. 
tfegnal W. Garff# Judg 
WELCONCUR: 
fat m* 3tf&*&4J 
JudithW. Billings/ Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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Harold A. Hintze 
Special Counsel for Plaintiff 
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FILED IN CUE«K*S ornce 
6*11 Uka County, Utah 
AUG IS 1985 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, a public 
entity, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT 
G. BARROWS; BEATRICE 
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K. 
DASKALAS, an individual, 
dba THE PAWN SHOP, THE PAWN 
SHOP, a Utah Corporation; 
JAMES ANDERSON, an indi-
vidual, dba JIM'S RIBS; 
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an indi-
vidual, dba AAA JEWELERS 
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND 
SALES, INC., a Utah Corpora-
tion; 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY 
Civil No. C85-4017 
JUDGE: Hon. Homer F, 
Wilkinson 
Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and Defendant Burge, Barrows and Barrows' 
Motion came on for a hearing pursuant to notice before 
EXHIBIT, e> oo°' 
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The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge on 
August 13, 1985 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiff being 
represented by Harold A. Hintze, Esq. and William D. 
Oswald, Esq., and Michael Chitwood Executive Director of 
the Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency being present, the 
defendants Juniata Irene Burge, Beatrice Irene Barrows 
and Robert G. Barrows being present and represented by 
John T. Evans, Esq. the defendants Ellen K. Daskalas, an 
individual, dba The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James 
Anderson, an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry 
Pantelakis, an individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, 
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation, neither 
appearing personally nor by and through their attorney 
of record Jerome Moody, Esq., said defendants having 
been served timely notice of said Motions but having 
heretofore filed a Stipulation for Immediate Occupancy 
which is on file herein, and Ray Zoll representing 
himself as a property owner and as attorney for the 
following land owners in Block 57, Plat "A", Salt Lake 
City Survey and located at 235 South Main Street, David 
Mortensen, Erv Wilfred, 235 South Main Associates, 235 
South Main, Inc., Egan and Associates, and Harold Egan, 
the parties and other land owners having reached an open 
court stipulation which has been recited and agreed to 
orally before the Court on August 13, 1985, said 
Stipulation to be the basis of an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy.
 t > t y 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND 
ADJUDGED: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy of the following described property, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point 166 feet west of the 
northeast Corner of Lot 6, Block 57, Plat 
"A" , Salt Lake City Survey, and running 
thence east 69 feet to the center of a 17 
inch party wall and which point is further 
evidenced by a metal plug inserted in the 
sidewalk north of said wall by R.W. 
Sorensen, licensed surveyor; thence south 
110 feet; thence west 68 feet; thence south 
55 feet; thence west 1 foot; thence north 
165 feet to the point of beginning. 
may be granted subject to and upon the following terms 
and provisions: 
(a) Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of 
the Court upon signing of this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the 
appraised value of the subject property based upon a 
written appraisal obtained by plaintiff. While retained 
by the Clerk of the Court, said funds shall be invested 
by the Clerk at the highest interest rate available for 
federally insured accounts. The plaintiff, however, 
agrees and warrants that said funds will earn interest 
at an effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate for 
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the 
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from the 
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that any 
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shortfall or difference between the actual interest 
earned by virtue of the Clerk's investment and the 11.5 
annual percentage rate shall be paid by the plaintiff to 
the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon demand as 
herein provided. While said funds are on deposit with 
the Clerk of the Court, all or any part of said funds 
may be withdrawn hereafter at the option of defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a 
written demand of Burge, Barrows and Barrows or their 
counsel of record. The withdrawal of all or any part of 
said deposited funds by defendants Burge, Barrows and 
Barrows shall constitute a waiver of any and all 
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject 
property as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, except the issue of just 
compensation which shall then be the sole issue reserved 
for trial. 
(b) On entry of this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
shall submit within ten (10) days of the date hereof to 
Lincoln Property Company N.C., Inc. (Lincoln) for 
signature an Agreement for Distribution of Land for 
Private Development (ADL). Said ADL must be fully 
executed by the Redevelopment Agency and Lincoln within 
thirty (30) days from date hereof. Within thirty (30) 
days from execution of the ADL by Lincoln, the 
0'-
- 5 -
Redevelopment Agency shall pay Burge, Barrows and 
Barrows $76,450.00 as hereinafter described and exercise 
its option to purchase and the owners shall sell the 
property located at 235 South Main Street, owned by 
Mountain States Creamery Company and David Mortensen 
pursuant to the written Offer to Purchase dated April 5, 
1985 and the Extension Agreement extending said Offer to 
sixty (60) days from date hereof. The Redevelopment 
Agency in disbursement of the purchase price for said 
Mortensen property may withhold, and Mortensen 
authorizes the Redevelopment Agency to pay to and assign 
to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows from said 
funds, and solely from said funds, the sum of $76,450.00 
to be paid to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon 
the closing of the Redevelopment Agency's acquisition of 
David Mortensen*s interest in the property located at 
235 South Main Street, but not to exceed thirty (30) 
days from the date Lincoln executes the ADL. Said sum 
of $76,450.00 shall be paid as additional compensation 
over and above any just compensation ultimately found by 
the court or jury in this case to be the fair market 
value of the property being condemned herein and the 
receipt of said funds shall not be an offset or 
deduction from said just compensation and the receipt of 
the same shall not be disclosed to the jury. Upon 
payment to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows of the 
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sum of $76,450.00, said defendants by receipt thereof, 
waive any and all defenses to the taking by condemnation 
of the subject property in the same manner as would 
occur by withdrawal of funds deposited with the Clerk of 
the Court pursuant to the aforementioned Section 
78-34-9. 
(c) David Mortensen's obligation in 
regards to the payment of the aforementioned $76,450.00 
is solely conditioned upon the Redevelopment Agency's 
election to exercise its right of acceptance under the 
aforementioned Offer to Purchase the property at 235 
South Main Street and if the fund from which this 
partial assignment has been made does not come into 
existence and Mortensen is not paid at least $76,450.00 
or entitled to immediate payment thereof by virtue of 
the fact that the Offer to Purchase is not consummated 
for any reason, said Mortensen shall have absolutely no 
liability to make any payments to the defendants Burge, 
Barrows and Barrows by virtue of this Order. 
(d) This Order of Occupancy shall not be 
effective unless or until, (1) the ADL is signed by 
Lincoln Property and the Redevelopment Agency within 
thirty (30) days from date hereof, and the sum of 
$76,450.00 above provided has been paid pursuant to the 
terms and provisions herein, or (2) the defendant land 
owners have withdrawn all or part of the $275,220.00 
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deposited with the Clerk of the Court as herein 
provided. 
(e) Based upon the terms and conditions of 
the oral Stipulation made to the Court, the Court does 
hereby enter an Order of Immediate Occupancy that the 
subject property is sought for uses by the public in 
connection with and as part of a redevelopment project 
authorized and approved by the City Council of Salt Lake 
City and the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, and 
the plaintiff is authorized to take immediate possession 
of said property and continue in possession of the same 
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of just 
compensation which, subject to the terms and provisions 
herein, is the only issue which may be raised in this 
action as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. Plaintiff or its agents may 
do such work thereon as may be required for the purposes 
for which said property is sought to be condemned 
including, but not limited to, demolition of existing 
improvements and construction of new improvements or 
structures, without interference by defendants or any of 
defendants' partners, agents, or employees, however, no 
demolition of the existing building, collecting of rent, 
or eviction of existing tenants pursuant to said Order 
of Immediate Occupancy will occur until the defendants 
have either withdrawn part or all of the $275,220.00 
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deposited with the Clerk of the Court as provided herein 
or have received payment from David Mortensen through 
the Redevelopment Agency of the $76,450.00 as herein 
provided. 
2. The Redevelopment Agency stipulates to 
extend the offers for purchase of the condominium 
properties located at 235 South Main Street, which 
include the owners represented herein by B. Ray Zoll, 
for sixty (60) days from the date hereof. 
3. Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows1 
Motion in regards to the manner of disbursement of funds 
to be deposited with the Clerk as above described came 
on for a hearing and no one appearing in opposition 
thereto, the Court being duly advised in the premises 
and good cause appearing therefore, now orders that 
under the terms of occupancy by the tenant-defendants, 
to-wit: Ellen K. Daskalas, an individual, dba The Pawn 
Shop, The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James Anderson, 
an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry Pantelakis, an 
individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, and Loans and 
Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation of the subject premises, 
said tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to 
be awarded in this action as just compensation and that 
all sums paid pursuant to this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and by virtue of the final judgment of just 
compensation shall be the sole property of, and are to 
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be paid directly to the owner-defendants, to-wit: 
Juniata Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice 
Irene Barrows without notice to or approval by the 
tenant-defendants. 
Dated this /6 day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
APROVED AS TO FROM: 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
omer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON H I N J L E Y 
William D. Oswald 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City 
Deputy Clerk 
mil ( c (/wr? 
Evans 
Ajttdrney for Defendants 
ju$ge, Barrows and Barrows 
B. Raj^Zoll 
Attorney for/Defeehdants 
Mortensen, Wrilfred, 235 South 
Main Associates, 235 South Main, 
Inc., Egan and Associates, and Egan 
and Pro Se 
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